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Loss of empathy is an early central symptom and diagnostic criterion of the behavioral
variant frontotemporal dementia (bvFTD). Although changes in empathy are evident
and strongly affect the social functioning of bvFTD patients, few studies have directly
investigated this issue by means of experimental paradigms. The current study assessed
multiple components of empathy (affective, cognitive and moral) in bvFTD patients. We
also explored whether the loss of empathy constitutes a primary deficit of bvFTD or
whether it is explained by impairments in executive functions (EF) or other social cognition
domains. Thirty-seven bvFTD patients with early/mild stages of the disease and 30 healthy
control participants were assessed with a task that involves the perception of intentional
and accidental harm. Participants were also evaluated on emotion recognition, theory of
mind (ToM), social norms knowledge and several EF domains. BvFTD patients presented
deficits in affective, cognitive and moral aspects of empathy. However, empathic concern
was the only aspect primarily affected in bvFTD that was neither related nor explained
by deficits in EF or other social cognition domains. Deficits in the cognitive and moral
aspects of empathy seem to depend on EF, emotion recognition and ToM. Our findings
highlight the importance of using tasks depicting real-life social scenarios because of their
greater sensitivity in the assessment of bvFTD. Moreover, our results contribute to the
understanding of primary and intrinsic empathy deficits of bvFTD and have important
theoretical and clinical implications.
Keywords: behavioral variant of frontotemporal dementia, empathy, empathic concern, social cognition, executive
functions, moral judgment
INTRODUCTION
Loss of empathy is an early symptom of behavioral variant of
frontotemporal dementia (bvFTD) and constitutes one of its
diagnostic criteria (Piguet et al., 2011; Rascovsky et al., 2011).
Patients with bvFTD display a diminished response to other’s
feelings and a diminished social interest or personal warmth
(Mendez, 2006; Rankin et al., 2006). From a clinical perspective,
empathy changes influence the interpersonal judgment, emo-
tions, behavior, and social functioning of bvFTD patients (Lough
et al., 2006; Piguet et al., 2011; Rascovsky et al., 2011). In
spite of its relevance, the study of empathy in bvFTD patients
using experimental designs has been scarce, and no studies have
explored whether relevant factors (Gregory et al., 2002; Possin
et al., 2013) such as executive functions (EF) and other social
cognition domains (OSCD) impact the empathic abilities of these
patients.
Empathy is essential for human social interaction, comprising
the capacity to share and understand the subjective experience of
others in reference to oneself (Decety, 2011). This complex con-
struct involves (1) affective components: sharing and responding
to the emotional experience of others; (2) cognitive components:
understanding the intentions and perspectives of others; and (3)
aspects related to the moral evaluation: judgments about the
wrongness of an action or the punishment that a perpetrator
deserves (Decety and Jackson, 2004; Decety et al., 2012).
In spite of the complexity of empathy, traditional approaches
to measure it have relied on self-report questionnaires. These
questionnaires consider empathy as a trait and do not fully
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represent empathic abilities because of their limited ecological
validity (Ickes, 2009). Nonetheless, most studies of empathy in
bvFTD patients (Rankin et al., 2005, 2006; Lough et al., 2006;
Eslinger et al., 2011) have employed self-report questionnaires,
evidencing impairments in affective and cognitive components.
We implemented a novel paradigm with naturalistic stimuli
that measures empathy for others’ physical pain. This type of
paradigm has been widely used due to the robustness of pain in
inducing empathic responses (Bernhardt and Singer, 2012) and
the well characterized neural circuit of empathy (Akitsuki and
Decety, 2009). Here we employed an adaptation of an empathy for
pain task (EPT) previously validated with behavioral measures,
eye-tracking and fMRI (Decety et al., 2012). This adapted version
has been used in the assessment of other neuropsychiatric popu-
lations (Baez et al., 2012, 2013; Baez and Ibanez, 2014). The task
evaluates empathy in the context of intentional/accidental harms
and consists of three different scenarios: (1) intentional or (2)
accidental harms in which one person is in a painful situation
intentionally or accidentally caused by another, and (3) neutral
or control situations. The EPT evaluates the following compo-
nents: (A) comprehension of the accidental or deliberate nature
of the action and the intention of the perpetrator to hurt (cogni-
tive components), (B) the empathic concern and the degree of
discomfort for the victim (affective components), and (C) the
correctness of the action and the punishment for the perpetrator
(moral aspects).
Individual differences in empathy seem to be affected by two
relevant factors: EF andOSCD. Some EF such as workingmemory
(Ze et al., 2014), inhibitory control (Hansen, 2011; Ze et al., 2014),
abstract reasoning and phonological fluency (Rankin et al., 2005)
have been associated with self-report measures of cognitive empa-
thy. Moreover, OSCD such as emotion processing (Singer, 2006),
theory of mind (ToM) (Singer and Lamm, 2009) and moral cog-
nition (Decety et al., 2012) have also been related to empathy.
For instance, accurate recognition of facial emotion expressions
is positively correlated with empathy (Besel and Yuille, 2010).
Similarly, there is a positive correlation between ToM and empa-
thy abilities (Shamay-Tsoory et al., 2007; Ibanez et al., 2013).
Moreover, the relationship between empathy and morality is well
established (e.g., Decety et al., 2012; Decety and Cowell, 2014;
Escobar et al., 2014; Yoder and Decety, 2014). Empathy-related
processes are thought to motivate prosocial behavior and caring
for others, and to provide a foundation for morality (Decety et al.,
2012; Decety and Cowell, 2014; Escobar et al., 2014). Empathy can
also interfere with morality by introducing partiality, for instance
by favoring ingroupmembers (Decety and Cowell, 2014). In addi-
tion, support for a link between empathy and moral cognition
is provided by a recent study (Gleichgerrcht and Young, 2013)
showing that low empathic concern levels predict utilitarian
moral judgment.
On the other hand, it is well known that both EF (Viskontas
et al., 2007; Torralva et al., 2009a; Possin et al., 2013) and
social cognition (Gleichgerrcht et al., 2010; Ibanez and Manes,
2012) are impaired in bvFTD, but there are no studies explor-
ing whether and how these factors affect the empathic abilities of
these patients. This study assessed multiple empathy components
in bvFTD patients by using an experimental paradigm involving
ecological validity. We also employed several EF and OSCD (emo-
tion recognition, ToM, and social norms knowledge) sensitive
measures for the bvFTD assessment. Finally, we explored whether
empathy deficits constitute a primary symptom of bvFTD or
whether they are secondary to or a consequence from the EF or
OSCD impairments.
METHODS AND MATERIALS
PARTICIPANTS
Thirty-seven patients fulfilled the Lund and Manchester criteria
(Neary et al., 1998) and the revised criteria for probable bvFTD
(Rascovsky et al., 2011) (see details regarding phenocopies or dif-
ferential diagnoses in Supplementary Data). Patients presented
with prominent changes in personality and social behavior as ver-
ified by caregivers. Diagnosis was made by a group of experts
in bvFTD. Patients underwent a standard examination battery
including neurological, neuropsychiatric and neuropsychological
assessments and a routine MRI. All patients were in early/mild
stages of the disease and did not meet the criteria for specific
psychiatric disorders. Patients presenting primarily with language
deficits were excluded. Of the 37 patients, 4 were excluded from
the EPT analyses for inability to perform the task.
Thirty healthy controls were recruited and matched one by
one with any of the bvFTD patients. Matching criteria were sex,
age (±4 years) and years of education (±4 years) (see Table 1).
Control subjects were recruited from a larger pool of volunteers
who did not have a history of drug abuse or a family history of
neurodegenerative or psychiatric disorders. All participants pro-
vided written informed consent in agreement with the Helsinki
declaration. The Ethics Committee of the Institute of Cognitive
Neurology approved this study.
INSTRUMENTS
The cognitive state was assessed using the Mini-Mental State
Examination (MMSE) (Folstein et al., 1983). The premobid
intellectual level was evaluated by the word accentuation test
(WAT-BA) (Burin et al., 2000).
Empathy assessment
We used an EPT previously employed in assessing other neu-
ropsychiatric populations (Baez et al., 2012, 2013). This task
evaluates empathy in the context of intentional and accidental
harms (Baez et al., 2012, 2013) and consists of 25 animated sce-
narios (11 intentional, 11 accidental, 3 neutral) involving two
individuals. Each scenario consists of 3 digital color pictures pre-
sented in a successive manner to imply motion. The durations of
the first, second, and third pictures in each animation were 500,
200, and 1000ms, respectively (see Figure 1 and Supplementary
Movie 1). The three following types of situations were depicted:
(1) intentional harm in which one person is in a painful situ-
ation intentionally caused by another, (e.g., purposely stepping
on someone’s toe); (2) accidental harm where one person is in a
painful situation accidentally caused by another; and (3) control
or neutral situations (e.g., one person receiving a flower given by
another).
Importantly, the faces of the protagonists were not visible
and thus there were no facial emotional reactions visible to
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Table 1 | Demographic, clinical and executive functions assessments.
BvFTD (n = 37) CTR (n = 30) BvFTD vs. CTR
Demographics Age (years) 66.0 (7.43) 55.0 (8.64) N.S.
Gender (F:M) 15:22 15:15 N.S.
Education (years) 13.68 (4.35) 14.67 (3.72) N.S.
MMSE 25.92 (3.53) 28.31 (1.54) <0.01
Social Cognition TASIT
Fear 2.26 (0.99) 3.27 (0.58) <0.01
Anger 3.18 (0.8) 3.7 (0.47) N.S.
Sadness 2.15 (1.1) 2.9 (0.61) <0.01
Surprise 3.5 (0.66) 3.83 (0.38) N.S.
Disgust 1.44 (0.96) 2.47 (0.94) <0.01
Total score 12.49 (2.74) 16.17 (1.56) <0.01
RMET 15.19 (5.24) 22.43 (4.95) <0.01
SNQ
Break score 2.35 (2.03) 2.04 (1.79) N.S
Over-adhere score 4.62 (1.71) 4.07 (2.11) N.S
Executive functions IFS Total Score 17.88 (6.15) 25.1 (1.87) <0.01
Motor series 2.54 (0.84) 2.97 (0.18) <0.01
Conflicting instructions 2.32 (0.97) 2.93 (0.25) <0.01
Go- no go 1.76 (1.14) 2.47 (0.51) <0.01
Backward digits span 3.43 (1.12) 4.37 (0.89) <0.01
Verbal Working memory 1.49 (0.69) 1.9 (0.31) <0.01
Spatial working memory 1.68 (0.88) 2.5 (0.94) <0.01
Abstraction capacity 1.53 (0.99) 2.7 (0.41) <0.01
Verbal inhibitory control 3.14 (2.02) 5.23 (0.68) <0.01
Phonological Fluency 10.88 (5.57) 16.3 (4.04) <0.01
Alternant design fluency 3.91 (2.01) 7.9 (2.4) <0.01
TMT-A 81.49 (48.26) 49.79 (23.08) <0.01
TMT-B 182.66 (93.22) 99.66 (52.44) <0.01
Hayling Test 21.68 (13.02) 9.31 (4.48) <0.01
IFS, INECO frontal screening; TMT, Trail making test; TASIT, The awareness of social inference test; RMET, Reading the mind in the eyes test; SNQ, social norms
questionnaire.
participants. However, body expressions and postures provided
sufficient information about the emotional reaction of the vic-
tim and the intention of the agent. Participants were asked to
respond 6 different questions: (1) cognitive aspects of empa-
thy: (a) intentionality (was the action done on purpose?) and
(b) intention of the perpetrator to hurt the victim (how bad
was the purpose?); (2) affective aspects: (c) emphatic concern
(how sad do you feel for the victim?) and (d) degree of dis-
comfort (how upset do you feel for what happened in the sit-
uation?); and (3) moral evaluation aspects: (e) correctness of
the action (how inappropriate was the action?) and (f) pun-
ishment (how much penalty does this action deserve?). The
question about the intentionality of the action was answered
selecting “Yes/No.” The other questions were answered using a
computer–based visual analog scale (it rates from −9 to 9, but
the numbers were not visible to participants; see Movie 1). The
meaning of the scale extremes depends on the question, for exam-
ple on the question “how sad do you feel for the victim?” one
extreme of the bar reads “I feel very sad” and the other extreme
reads “I don’t feel sad at all.” Accuracy for the intentionality
question, and ratings as well as raw RTs for the other questions
were measured. The RTs measured the time that passed from
the moment the question appeared, to the time the participant
answered.
Before testing, all participants performed a training session
consisting in a shorter version of the task with similar situations,
to ensure the correct understanding of the instructions.
Other social cognition domains (OSCD)
Recognition of emotional states
The awareness of social inference test (TASIT). The TASIT is a
test of social perception that involves videotaped vignettes of
everyday social interactions (McDonald et al., 2003, 2006; Kipps
et al., 2009b) which has been proved to be useful for detect-
ing subtle deficits in bvFTD patients (Kipps et al., 2009a). This
task introduces contextual cues (e.g., prosody, facial movement,
and gestures) and additional processing demands (e.g., adequate
speed of information processing, selective attention, and social
reasoning) that are not taxed when viewing static displays. We
considered only part 1, called the emotion evaluation test (EET),
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FIGURE 1 | (A)Examples of the visual stimuli used for each category. The durations of the first, second, and third picturewere 1000, 200, and 1000ms, respectively.
(B) Examples of the questions designed to assess different empathy aspects. Each question was answered using a computer-based visual analog scale.
which assesses recognition of spontaneous emotional expression
(fearful, surprised, sad, angry and disgusted). In the EET, speaker
demeanor (voice, facial expression and gesture) together with the
social situation indicate the emotional meaning. In some scenes,
there is only one actor talking, who is either on the telephone or
talking directly to the camera. Other scenes depict two actors and
instructions are given to focus on one of them. All scripts are
neutral in content and do not lend themselves to any particular
emotion. The brief EET comprises a series of 20 short (15–60 s)
videotaped vignettes of trained professional actors interacting in
everyday situations. After viewing each scene, the test partici-
pant is instructed to choose from a forced-choice list the emotion
expressed by the focused actor.
ToM
Reading the mind in the eyes (RMET). This test (Baron-Cohen
et al., 1997) evaluates the emotional inference aspect of the
ToM and is another sensitive task for the assessment of bvFTD
patients (Torralva et al., 2009a). This is a computerized and val-
idated test which consist of 36 pictures of the eye region of a
face. Participants are asked to choose which of four words best
describes what the person in each photograph is thinking or
feeling.
Social norms knowledge
Social norms questionnaire (SNQ).We used a previously validated
version (Baez et al., 2013) of the SNQ. This questionnaire con-
sists of 22 yes-no questions, wich has been previously employed
in the assessment of bvFTD patients (Possin et al., 2013). The
participants were asked to determine whether a behavior would
be appropriate in the presence of an acquaintance (not a close
friend or family member) according to the mainstream culture.
Two scores were derived. The break score was defined as the total
number of errors made in the direction of breaking a social norm,
and the over-adhere score was defined as the total number of
errors made in the direction of over adherence to a perceived
social norm.
Executive functions (EF)
All participants were evaluated with an EF battery which included
the INECO frontal screening (IFS) (Torralva et al., 2009b) and
measures of verbal fluency, inhibitory control, speed process-
ing, working memory and cognitive flexibility. The IFS has been
shown to successfully detect executive dysfunction in patients
with dementia (Torralva et al., 2009b; Gleichgerrcht et al.,
2011). This test includes the following eight subtests: (1) motor
programming (Luria series, “fist, edge, palm”); (2) conflicting
instructions (subjects were asked to hit the table once when the
administrator hit it twice, or to hit the table twice when the
administrator hit it only once); (3) motor inhibitory control;
(4) numerical working memory (backward digit span); (5) ver-
bal working memory (months backwards); (6) spatial working
memory (modified Corsi tapping test); (7) abstraction capacity
(inferring the meaning of proverbs), and (8) verbal inhibitory
control (modified Hayling test). The maximum possible score on
the IFS is 30 points.
Verbal and design fluency tests (Delis and Kaplan, 2001) were
used to assess recall, self-monitoring and cognitive flexibility
strategies. The trail-making test part B (Partington, 1949) was
employed to assess cognitive flexibility and processing speed, and
the Hayling test (Burgess and Shallice, 1996) was used to measure
inhibitory control.
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DATA ANALYSIS
Demographic and neuropsychological data were compared using
one-way ANOVA and chi square tests for the categorical variables.
The ratings and RTs for each question of the EPT were ana-
lyzed using 2 × 3 repeated-measures ANOVA comprising the
factors of group (bvFTD, control) and condition (intentional,
accidental, neutral). Tukey’s HSD post-hoc tests were used (when
appropriate) to examine group differences within each condition.
To control for general cognitive state on the EPT and OSCD
performances, we applied ANCOVA tests adjusted for the MMSE
scores (reporting only effects that were still significant after
covarying). To determine whether empathy deficits were related
to EF or OSCD, the empathy results were re-analyzed using the
raw total scores of each measure of OSCD and EF indepen-
dently as covariates [see for a similar approach (Rowe et al.,
2001)]. These two analyses were conducted separately. The first
one included all the EF total scores (IFS, verbal and design fluen-
cies, TMT-B and Hayling test) as covariates, while the second one
included all the OSCD measures (TASIT, RMET and SQN).
Finally, we conducted multiple regression analyses to explore
whether empathy performance was partially explained by specific
impairments in EF or OSCD. We estimated two different models
in which the empathy measures that were still significantly dif-
ferent between groups after any of the covariance analyses were
separately considered as dependent variables. The first model
included a score of intentionality (the mean of the three con-
ditions) as dependent variable; the second one considered as
dependent variable the empathic concern scores for intentional
pain situations. The group, the gender, a global score of OSCD
(mean accuracy on TASIT and RMET) and the IFS total score
were included as predictors. Gender was included as predictor
since several studies (e.g., Baron-Cohen and Wheelwright, 2004;
Toussaint andWebb, 2005; Preis and Kroener-Herwig, 2012) have
reported that women show higher levels of empathy than males.
We choose a global score of the OSCD from TASIT and RMET
because in this and previous studies (Kipps et al., 2009a; Torralva
et al., 2009a) detected bvFTD impairments. The IFS was also
selected as a predictor because this tool includes several EF sub-
tests and detects bvFTD executive dysfunction (Torralva et al.,
2009b).
RESULTS
DEMOGRAPHIC DATA AND GENERAL COGNITIVE STATE
Groups were matched by age [F(1, 65) = 0.10, p = 0.74], gender
[X2(1) = 0.59, p = 0.44], education [F(1, 65) = 0.97, p = 0.32].
No differences between groups were observed in the premor-
bid IQ [F(1, 65) = 1.54, p = 0.21]. As expected, bvFTD patients
showed lower MMSE performance than controls [F(1, 65) =
11.55, p < 0.01] (see Table 1).
To control for the effect of general cognitive state on empa-
thy and OSCD performances, we applied ANCOVA tests adjusted
for the MMSE scores. The empathy and OSCD results reported
bellow correspond to the effects that were still significant after
covariation.
EMPATHY
Results are summarized in Figure 2.
Cognitive components
Regarding intentionality comprehension, a main effect of con-
dition was observed [F(2, 122) = 7.43, p < 0.01, η2 = 0.11].
Post-hoc analysis (Tukey HSD, MS = 4.89, df = 122) revealed
that intentionality comprehension of intentional pain situations
(p < 0.01) and neutral situations (p < 0.01) was higher than the
comprehension of accidental pain situations. A significant inter-
action between group and condition [F(2, 122) = 3.15, p < 0.05,
η2 = 0.06] were also observed in intentionality judgments. Post-
hoc analysis (Tukey’s HSD, MS = 464.81, df = 179.92) revealed
that bvFTD patients (hereafter referred to as patients) had sig-
nificantly lower comprehension of the intentionality of acci-
dental (p < 0.01) situations compared to controls. Intra-group
comparisons using repeated-measures ANOVA showed signifi-
cant differences in the intentionality comprehension among the
3 conditions in patients [F(2, 64) = 4.75, p < 0.05, η2 = 0.14].
A post-hoc comparison (Tukey HSD, MS = 750.19, df = 64)
revealed that intentionality comprehension of intentional (p <
0.05) and neutral situations (p < 0.05) was higher than the com-
prehension of accidental pain situations. In controls, there was a
trend toward a better comprehension of intentional pain situa-
tions compared to the accidental ones [F(2, 58) = 2.88, p < 0.06,
η2 = 0.09].
Furthermore, a significant interaction between group and con-
dition was observed in ratings of intention to hurt [F(2, 122) =
16.44, p < 0.01, η2 = 0.21]. Post-hoc analysis (Tukey HSD, MS=
10.29, df = 23.72) showed that patients had higher ratings than
controls for neutral (p < 0.05) and accidental (p < 0.01) situa-
tions. Intra-group comparisons using repeated-measures ANOVA
showed significant differences in the intention to hurt ratings
among the 3 conditions in both patients [F(2, 64) = 94.45, p <
0.01, η2 = 0.77] and controls [F(2, 58) = 316.54, p < 0.01, η2 =
0.91]. Post-hoc comparisons [patients:(Tukey HSD, MS = 6.19,
df = 64), controls: (Tukey HSD, MS = 3.58, df = 58)] revealed
that in both groups intention to hurt ratings for intentional pain
situations were higher than for neutral (p < 0.01) and acciden-
tal (p < 0.01) situations. Furthermore, in both groups intention
to hurt ratings for accidental pain situations were higher than for
neutral situations (p < 0.01).
Affective components
A significant interaction between group an condition was
observed in the empathic concern ratings [F(2, 122) = 10.02, p <
0.01, η2 = 0.14]. Post-hoc analysis (Tukey HSD, MS = 10.69,
df = 155.04) revealed that patients rated intentional pain sit-
uations lower (p < 0.05) than controls. Furthermore, controls
showed higher empathic concern for intentional than accidental
pain situations (p < 0.01). This difference was not observed in
patients (p = 0.78).
Moral aspects
There was a significant interaction between group and condi-
tion in correctness ratings [F(2, 122) = 513, p < 0.01, η2 = 0.07].
Post-hoc analysis (Tukey HSD, MS = 9.62, df = 170.63) showed
that patients rated neutral situations as more incorrect than con-
trols (p < 0.01). A significant interaction between group and
condition [F(2, 122) = 6.24, p < 0.01, η2 = 0.09] were also found
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in punishment ratings. Post-hoc analysis (Tukey’s HSD, MS =
11.21, df = 127.24) showed that patients rated neutral (p < 0.01)
situations higher than controls.
No RTs differences were observed between groups.
SOCIAL COGNITION AND EF
The OSCD and EF results are shown in Table 1 (see details
in Supplementary Data). Regarding social cognition, patients
showed lower performance on TASIT (as well as scores of sadness,
fear and disgust recognition) and RMET scores than controls. No
group differences were observed in SNQ scores. Regarding EF,
patients showed a lower performance than controls on the IFS
total score, cognitive flexibility, the Hayling test and the verbal
phonological fluency task.
RE-ANALYSIS OF EMPATHY DATA WITH SOCIAL COGNITION
MEASURES AS COVARIATES
Group differences in the intentionality comprehension (acci-
dental pain situations) remained significant after adjusting
for OSCD [F(1, 59) = 5.72, p < 0.05, η2 = 0.09]. Similarly,
group differences in empathic concern for intentional pain
situation were preserved [F(1, 59) = 6.98, p < 0.05, η2 = 0.1].
Nonetheless, differences in intention to hurt ratings for neu-
tral [F(1, 59) = 0.95, p = 0.33, η2 = 0.01] and accidental
situations [F(1, 59) = 4.00, p = 0.06. η2 = 0.06] were not
preserved after co-varying. Differences between groups in
correctness [F(1, 59) = 2.03, p = 0.15, η2 = 0.03] and punish-
ment [F(1, 59) = 2.63, p = 0.11, η2 = 0.04] ratings for neutral
situations also disappeared (Figure 2).
RE-ANALYSIS OF EMPATHY DATA WITH EF AS COVARIATES
Group differences in the intentionality comprehension (acci-
dental pain situations) did not remain significant after adjusting
for EF [F(1, 53) = 2.24, p = 0.14, η2 = 0.03]. A significant
effect of the Hayling test performance on accidental situations
comprehension was observed [F(1, 53) = 6.47, p < 0.05,
η2 = 0.1].
Significant group differences in empathic concern ratings for
intentional pain situations were preserved [F(1, 53) = 16.53, p <
0.01, η2 = 0.24] after covariate analysis. However, differences
in intention to hurt ratings for neutral [F(1, 53) = 0.05, p =
0.81, η2 = 0.001] and accidental situations [F(1, 53) = 1.07, p =
0.30, η2 = 0.01] were not preserved after co-varying, as well as
correctness [F(1, 53) = 0.12, p = 0.72, η2 = 0.001] and punish-
ment [F(1, 53) = 0.047, p = 0.82, η2 = 0.05] ratings for neutral
situations (Figure 2).
IS THE EMPATHY PERFORMANCE PARTIALLY EXPLAINED BY EF, OSCD
OR GENERAL COGNITIVE STATE?
Figure 3 shows associations inmultiple regression analyses index-
ing the role of EF and OSCD. A first model including the
intentionality score as dependent variable [F(4, 58) = 8.59, p <
0.01, R2 = 0.38] showed that EF (beta = 0.28, η2 = 0.06) and
group (beta = −0.29, η2 = 0.06) predicted the intentionality
comprehension, explaining 38% of the variance. We carried out
a second model with empathic concern for intentional pain sit-
uations as dependent variable. This model [F(4, 58) = 5.16, p <
0.01, R2 = 0.26] evidenced that group (but not EF or OSCD)
was the only predictor (beta = 0.55, η2 = 0.16) associated with
empathic concern ratings, explaining 26% of the variance.
FIGURE 2 | Performance in the empathy for pain task and significant
differences between groups. Differences that were statistically
significant are indicated by ∗(before co-varying), ∗∗(after co-varying by
social cognition measures), and ∗∗∗(after co-varying by EF). (A)
Intentionality judgments; (B) Intention to hurt ratings; (C) Empathic
concern ratings; (D) Discomfort ratings; (E) Correctness ratings; (F)
Punishment ratings. NS, neutral situations; IPS, intentional pain
situations, APS, accidental pain situations.
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To confirm this last result, we estimated three different multi-
ple regression models considering the score of empathic concern
for intentional pain situations as dependent variable and includ-
ing independently group and all the EF and OSCD measures as
predictors. The first model including all EF variables [F(6, 56) =
3.60, p < 0.01, R2 = 0.22] showed that group (beta = 0.66,
η2 = 0.23) was the only predictor associated to empathic con-
cern. Similarly, the second model including all OSCD vari-
ables [F(4, 58) = 3.90, p < 0.05, R2 = 0.30] evidenced that group
(beta = 0.45, η2 = 0.11) was the only significant predictor. The
third model including all EF and OSCD variables confirmed
that group (beta = 0.54, η2 = 0.14) was the only predictor
FIGURE 3 | Multiple regression analyses. (A) Regression analysis using
intentionality comprehension as the dependent variable. Executive
functions significantly predicted the intentionality comprehension. (B)
Regression analysis using empathic concern as the dependent variable. No
significant associations were observed between empathic concern and
social cognition or executive functions.
Table 2 | Coefficients of the multiple regression models of empathic
concern.
Variables Model I Model II Model III
β p β p β p
Group 0.66 0.0002 0.45 0.01 0.54 0.01
IFS total score 0.23 0.34 0.13 0.61
Phonological fluency −0.18 0.29 −0.19 0.29
Design fluency 0.08 0.68 0.09 0.68
Cognitive flexibility (TMT-B) 0.28 0.11 0.34 0.16
Inhibitory control (Hayling test) 0.28 0.21 0.20 0.30
Emotion recognition (TASIT) 0.09 0.42 0.17 0.35
Theory of mind (RMET) 0.10 0.51 0.05 0.71
Social norms knowledge (SNQ) −0.06 0.66 0.01 0.89
IFS, INECO frontal screening; TMT, Trail Making Test; TASIT, The awareness of
social inference test; RMET, Reading the mind in the eyes; SNQ, Social norms
questionnaire.
significantly associated with empathic concern [F(9, 53) = 2.13,
p < 0.05, R2 = 0.30] (see Table 2).
In brief, EF predicted the intentionality comprehension but
not the empathic concern. Social cognition was not associated
with any of the dependent variables. Empathic concern was not
explained by any predictor.
To explore whether empathic concern depends on the general
cognitive state or disease severity, we also compared the per-
formance of patients with high (54%) and low (46%) MMSE
scores (cut-off = 27). No group differences in empathic con-
cern [t(31) = 0.80, p = 0.42] were found, suggesting an early and
primary involvement.
DISCUSSION
Although empathy deficits are considered a central feature and
diagnostic criterion of bvFTD, no studies had directly explored
the contribution of different empathy aspects and whether and
how relevant factors such as EF and social cognition affect the
empathic abilities of these patients. Our results replicate previ-
ous findings of EF (Torralva et al., 2009a,b) and social cognition
(Gleichgerrcht et al., 2010; Possin et al., 2013) impairments in
bvFTD [except for the lack of differences in SNQ scores (Possin
et al., 2013)], that would be explained by population’s cultural
differences. Moreover, we provide evidence of a primary deficit in
empathic concern that is not related to deficits in EF or OSCD.
The identification and further assessment of the primary empa-
thy deficits of bvFTD patients may be useful in the establishment
of behavioral patterns and potentially in predicting the disease
progression based on empathic concern levels.
DIFFERENTIAL IMPAIRMENTS OF EMPATHY COMPONENTS
Impaired cognitive components (distinguishing accidental from
neutral and intentional situations) were observed in patients. This
is expected because empathy is a contextual phenomenon affected
by stimulus ambiguity (Melloni et al., 2013). Contextual cues
help to bias the intrinsic meaning of ambiguous targets (Bar,
2004; Amoruso et al., 2014), particularly regarding others in pain
(Melloni et al., 2013) and social cognition (Ibanez et al., 2014a).
According with a previous study in healthy subjects (Decety et al.,
2012), our results show that intentionality comprehension of
intentional pain situations was higher than the comprehension of
accidental pain situations. This suggests that accidental pain situ-
ations are less clear and explicit, increasing the level of ambiguity
and the demands in the attribution of the action’s intentionality.
Moreover, patients with bvFTD have deficits in inferring the
intentionality of others’ actions (Gregory et al., 2002; Torralva
et al., 2009a; Poletti et al., 2012), and in understanding ambigu-
ous emotional scenes (Fernandez-Duque et al., 2010). Thus, our
results seem to be consistent with the current view suggesting
that these patients have deficits in processing contextual social
cues (Neary et al., 1998; Ibanez and Manes, 2012). However, as
the EPT employed here does not permit to disentangle whether
patients have deficits in analyzing contextual social cues, further
studies should strictly control for the context dependency levels
of empathy tasks, including control conditions or experimental
manipulation of contextual cues. In addition, it is worth to men-
tion that the cognitive components of empathy assessed in this
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study have been associated to mentalizing (Zaki and Ochsner,
2012), a fundamental ability to empathize with others by con-
sidering their mental states. Impairments in this ability have also
been reported in bvFTD patients (Downey et al., 2013; Cerami
et al., 2014). Future studies using experimental paradigms for
assessing empathy should include other cognitive aspects such as
perspective taking.
Patients rated the intention to hurt for neutral/accidental sit-
uations higher than controls. In contrast, as reported by previous
studies (Akitsuki and Decety, 2009; Decety et al., 2012), we found
that intention to hurt ratings of healthy participants are greater
for intentional than for accidental pain situations. Intentionality
detection is a decisive step in determining whether an action was
malicious (Decety et al., 2012). The inability to infer the inten-
tions of others’ actions may affect the intention to hurt ratings.
Patients with bvFTD tend to overattribute bad intentions to the
agent (Gregory et al., 2002; Kipps and Hodges, 2006), even if the
action was unintentional.
Regarding affective components, bvFTD patients showed
lower empathic concern ratings for intentional pain situations.
Previous bvFTD studies (Lough et al., 2006; Rankin et al., 2006;
Eslinger et al., 2011) have reported diminished levels of empathic
concern as rated by relatives or caregivers. Thus, this characteristic
appears to be a core component of bvFTD empathy impairments
(see below).
On aspects related to moral evaluation, patients rated neutral
situations more morally wrong than controls. However, neutral
situations did not represent a wrong action. Again, these findings
suggest deficits in inferring the intentionality of the action and
in attributing bad intention, even when this was not the purpose.
Moral reasoning relies on both affective and cognitive processes
to integrate intentions and action consequences (Decety et al.,
2012). In agreement with previous reports (Mendez et al., 2005;
Lough et al., 2006; Mendez, 2006; Baez et al., 2014), our results
suggest that moral reasoning is impaired in bvFTD.
Overall, the empathy profile of patients was characterized by
impairments in cognitive, affective andmoral aspects. Taking into
account that intentionality detection is a decisive step in deter-
mining whether an action was malicious and ratings of intention
to hurt are associated with ratings of punishment (Decety et al.,
2012), our results suggest that deficits in the ability to infer the
intentionality of another’s actions seem to affect cognitive com-
ponents and moral aspects. Conversely, empathic concern seems
to be the only component primarily affected in bvFTD.
ARE EMPATHY DEFICITS EXPLAINED BY EF OR OSCD?
Impairments in the cognitive components of bvFTD patients
remained significant after adjusting for social cognition but disap-
peared after co-varying for EF. In line with this finding, previous
studies (Rankin et al., 2005; Hansen, 2011; Ze et al., 2014) have
been suggested a link between EF and empathy. Specifically, work-
ing memory (Ze et al., 2014), inhibitory control (Hansen, 2011;
Ze et al., 2014), abstract reasoning and phonological fluency
(Rankin et al., 2005) are particularly associated with self-report
measures of cognitive empathy. Thus, inferring the others’ inten-
tions requires the inhibition of one’s own perspective (Ruby
and Decety, 2003; Samson et al., 2005). Furthermore, working
memory is required to hold and manipulate cues from multiple
sources of input, particularly in more complex social situations
(Rankin et al., 2006; Meyer et al., 2012). During the EPT, acci-
dental pain situations are less clear and explicit. Therefore, it is
possible that the accurate recognition of these situations requires
a higher EF demand.
Similarly, the significance of intention to hurt, correctness
and punishment ratings also disappeared after co-varying for
EF. These three empathy aspects are strongly dependent on the
observer’s interpretation of intention, and the EF profile seems
to explain these deficits. In bvFTD (Lough et al., 2006; Eslinger
et al., 2011), a relationship between cognitive components (rated
by caregivers) and EF has been evidenced. The same group dif-
ferences also disappeared after co-varying for social cognition,
consistent with the fact that some aspects of empathy are related
to emotion recognition (Martin et al., 1996; Besel and Yuille,
2010) and ToM (Shamay-Tsoory et al., 2007; Ibanez et al., 2013)
abilities. Moreover, the deficits inmoral aspects in bvFTD patients
may be partially explained by an empathic loss in emotionally
identifying with others (Mendez et al., 2005). Thus, emotion
recognition and ToM deficits account for the abnormalities in
cognitive and moral aspects of empathy observed in patients with
bvFTD.
Differences in empathic concern for intentional situations
remained significant after co-varying for both EF and OSCD.
These results suggest that bvFTD patients have a core deficit
in other-oriented emotional reactions to the misfortune of oth-
ers. We performed multiple regressions to further explore which
empathy aspects were primary affected. We choose a global score
of the OSCD from TASIT and RMET because in this and previous
studies (Kipps et al., 2009a; Torralva et al., 2009a) detected bvFTD
impairments. The IFS was also selected as a predictor because
this tool includes several EF subtests and detects bvFTD executive
dysfunction (Torralva et al., 2009b). Multiple regression results
showed that empathic concern was not predicted by EF or OSCD.
EMPHATIC CONCERN AS THE PRIMARY AFFECTATION OF BVFTD
Taken together, our results suggest that empathic concern is the
only component primarily affected in bvFTD that is neither
related nor explained by EF/OSCD deficits or the general cogni-
tive status. In contrast, deficits in cognitive and moral aspects of
empathy seem to depend on other processes such as EF, emotion
recognition or ToM.
The degree of discomfort (an affective component) was pre-
served in patients. Unlike empathic concern, the discomfort
degree involves self-oriented feelings of personal unease when
exposed to the suffering of others (Davis et al., 1994). Moreover,
discomfort may produce an egoistic motivation to reduce one’s
own personal distress, whereas empathic concernmay instigate an
altruistic motivation to help the other. Thus, the other-oriented
emotional response that produces a motivational state to increase
the other’s welfare was intrinsically affected in bvFTD, constitut-
ing the core of empathy impairments observed in these patients.
Theoretical approaches (Decety and Jackson, 2004) and
empirical evidence (Rankin et al., 2006) agree that empa-
thy relies on dissociable affective and cognitive components.
Emotional components of empathy are foundational, while
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cognitive components are more complex and may depend upon
other abilities (Rankin et al., 2006). Thus, diminished other-
oriented emotional responses may be sufficient to produce the
daily empathy impairments observed in bvFTD patients.
Neuroimaging studies of empathy (Carr et al., 2003; Rankin
et al., 2006) highlight a network that includes the inferior and
medial frontal cortex, amygdala, right somatosensory cortex,
right temporal pole and insula; all brain areas usually affected in
bvFTD (Rosen et al., 2002; Seeley et al., 2008; Couto et al., 2013).
Moreover the subgenual cortex, as an ACC adjacent area may rep-
resent a point of interest for futures studies about empathy and its
neurobiological bases in neurodegenerative diseases (Zahn et al.,
2009). Overall, the brain atrophy pattern previously reported in
bvFTD is consistent with the primary deficit in empathic concern
observed in this study. Our findings open new pathways to inves-
tigate whether impairments in empathic concern could predict
the atrophy pattern, behavioral changes, and the clinical profile of
bvFTD. Although this is the first study in evidencing the empathic
concern deficits usually reported by bvFTD relatives by means of
an experimental method, our patients were assessed only with
routine MRI recordings. Further volumetric and fMRI studies
may provide additional insights about the relationship among the
location of atrophy and the associated pattern of empathy impair-
ments. An inter-level social neuroscience approach (Ibanez et al.,
2014a) combining the study of social behavior, neural networks,
and the interactions between social behaviors and social cognition
would help to provide a better understanding of bvFTD (Ibanez
et al., 2014b). This novel approach would allow psychiatrists and
neurologists to contribute a powerful multidisciplinary and trans-
disciplinary approach (Maj, 2012), that would be both clinically
and theoretically relevant to major advances in contemporary
neuropsychiatry.
From a clinical perspective, given that adequate empathic
functioning is an important element of higher social function-
ing (Rankin et al., 2005), such an impairment should be con-
sidered in the assessment and treatment of bvFTD, as well as
during cognitive-affective interventions (Ibanez et al., 2014c).
Furthermore, one of the strengths of the current study is its
reliance on an ecological design that is more appropriate than
self-report questionnaires. However, future studies should assess
whether empathy aspects evaluated by experimental tasks are
related to the components measured by classical self-report
questionnaires such as the Index of Interpersonal Reactivity.
It is well-known that even frontal patients are impaired in their
everyday lives. It is difficult to detect impairments with traditional
tests because standard and decontextualized neuropsychological
assessments introduce sufficient external structure to suppress
some behavioral tendencies (Mesulam, 1986). Besides traditional
methods for assessing cognitive deficits following frontal lobe
damage typically does not measure the full range of deficits that
can occur. In particular, rostral prefrontal cortex supports func-
tions which are not routinely assessed yet are crucial to competent
everyday life performance (Burgess et al., 2009). Remarkably,
the task employed here detected experimentally (Lough et al.,
2006; Eslinger et al., 2011) early empathy deficits in bvFTD
patients. The convergence between observations in experimen-
tal, clinical and everyday life settings highlights the importance
of considering empathic concern impairments as a core symp-
tom of bvFTD. These results emphasize the value of using tasks
involving real-life social scenarios (Torralva et al., 2009a; Ibanez
and Manes, 2012) as evidenced by their greater sensitivity in the
clinical assessment of neuropsychiatric populations. Moreover
the current findings suggest that social cognition assessment, par-
ticularly the evaluation of empathy, should be part of the clinical
screening for dementia. Future studies should explore differences
between bvFTD and other forms of dementia and test whether
empathy could predict the likelihood of bvFTD. A more subtle
understanding of these complex cognitive deficits in bvFTD will
improve assessment in the clinical setting and may allow for the
development of rational cognitive stimulation strategies.
SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL
The Supplementary Material for this article can be found
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